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Erasmus+ is a powerful tool of public diplomacy for the European Union (EU); however, 
its international dimension remains under-researched. This paper seeks to help bridge 
this gap by analysing the degree to which the EU’s engagement through Erasmus+ is 
embedded in the overarching frameworks of its neighbourhood and enlargement 
policies. Drawing in particular on the experience of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU’s engagement in the Eastern Partnership and the 
Western Balkans is scrutinised under three lenses: the objectives pursued, their 
implementation, and the domestic receptibility of Erasmus+. The paper finds a low 
degree of Erasmus+ embeddedness in the Eastern Partnership framework and a 
moderate degree of integration in the enlargement framework. In light of this finding, 
it argues that the EU should better employ this valuable tool in its external action and 
diplomacy. The three countries are highly receptive, but domestic constraints must be 
considered in EU planning. The paper concludes with policy recommendations that 
seek to better embed Erasmus+ in the EU’s external policies, as well as to capitalise on 





Introduction: Erasmus+ beyond the EU27 
 
Before the news of the United Kingdom leaving Erasmus+, little public attention had 
been given to the operation of the European Union’s (EU) programme for Education, 
Training, Youth, and Sport beyond its borders, and more generally to the role of Higher 
Education (HE) policy in EU external action. As a supplementary EU competence and 
a nationally sensitive question, education policy on the Union level has mostly been 
constrained to mobility activities, intergovernmentally established benchmarks, and 
the wider process of accreditation harmonisation known as the Bologna Process. This 
bears the question to what extent the EU displays a meaningful external engagement 
based on Erasmus+. 
 
Most of the available literature on the EU’s external HE engagement examines the 
Bologna Process, EU-induced reforms in HE, or generally HE in one or more countries, 
taking into account relevant socio-historical factors and related processes.1 
Nonetheless, scholars do not relate their findings to the EU’s wider relationship with the 
country or countries under scrutiny. As a result, the question of differentiation in the 
EU’s engagement through Erasmus+ in different parts of the world remains largely 
uncharted. Particularly in regions of high importance for the EU, engagement could 
be tailored to the wider policy framework, utilising existing networks and relationships, 
or be used as a medium to achieve region-specific objectives. 
 
Erasmus+ can have a significant effect on citizens’ perceptions, not least through 
exchanges. Similarly, capacity building, dialogue, and academic expertise in EU 
affairs can promote reforms and increase knowledge about the EU in society. The 
 
1 K. Rostiashvili, “Higher Education in Transition: From Corruption to Freedom of Information in 
Post-Soviet Georgia”, European Education, vol. 43, no. 4, 2012, p. 34; J.P. Jallade, “International 
Approaches to Education: A Review of Some Major Cooperative Programmes”, European 
Journal of Education, vol. 46, no. 1, 2011, p. 15; P. Furlong, “The Bologna Process: Informal 
Governance in the Wider Europe”, lecture, UACES 41st Annual Conference, Cambridge, 5 
September 2011, p. 16; V. Kushnarenko, L. Cojocari, “Internationalisation of Higher Education 
in Post-Soviet Small States: Realities and Perspectives of Moldova”, Current Issues in 
Comparative Education, vol. 15, no. 1, 2012, p. 134; S. Wulk, The Role and Relevance of Higher 
Education Policy in EU External Relations: An Analysis of the Transmissive, Transformative and 
Transactional Qualities of University Institutions and Programmes, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015; 
L. Highman, “The EU’s External Engagement in Higher Education: Externalizing the Bologna 
Process”, in C. Damro, S. Gstöhl, S. Schunz (eds), The European Union’s Evolving External 
Engagement: Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies? Abingdon, Routledge, 2018, 196-215; C. 
Gerards, S. Schunz, C. Damro, “Opportunity, Presence and Entrepreneurship: Why the EU Acts 
Externally on Higher Education”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2021, https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/jcms.13154. 
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visibility of Erasmus+ is an important resource to this end; indicatively, educational 
programmes are the most well-known EU activities in the Eastern Partnership (EaP), 
which renders Erasmus+ an invaluable tool for the EU’s public diplomacy.2 As argued 
in the literature, even though education does not form part of the EU’s main external 
action priorities, it remains a significant “resource for creating soft power”.3 The present 
study aims to highlight the role of Erasmus+ in EU external policy and diplomacy and 
contribute to this nascent body of literature on EU education policy.  
 
This paper investigates the link between Erasmus+ and overarching policy frameworks 
in the Western Balkans and the EaP. It tries to determine to what extent the EU’s 
engagement through Erasmus+ in HE in the two regions is embedded in the wider pre-
accession framework and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In other words, 
it examines to what extent Erasmus+ engagement in these regions is tailored to and 
conditioned by the overarching geographic policy framework. 
 
To do so, three indicators of engagement are examined: first, the objectives pursued 
by the EU in the two regions, covering general objectives of external HE activity, 
specific HE objectives for the two regions, as well as general objectives of EU 
enlargement and neighbourhood policies which can be related to HE. Second, the 
implementation of Erasmus+ is investigated, comprising resources, consultation with 
domestic actors, and synergies with the wider framework of EU action. Finally, 
receptibility tests the programme’s domestic acceptance. To determine the degree 
of embeddedness, these findings will be compared against general external HE 
engagement and against relevant aspects of the policy frameworks under scrutiny 
throughout. 
 
The indicators are examined on the regional level and with a particular focus on 
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova (hereafter: Moldova), and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH). The three cases are comparable as they all have European aspirations but are 
not candidate states; they have access to the same range of opportunities under 
Erasmus+; they are post-socialist republics, which has significantly impacted public 
institutions; and they face statehood consolidation problems.  
 
2 EU Neighbours East, “Annual Survey Report: 4th Wave”, May 2019, p. 18. 
3 H. Zichner, V. Saran, “The EU’s Education Policy Abroad: The ‘Power of Attraction’ and the 
Case of Moldova”, in B. Bruno, D. Happ, H. Zichner (eds), European Neighbourhood Policy: 




External engagement through Erasmus+ refers to the international HE dimension of the 
2014-2020 programme. This includes student and staff mobility through International 
Credit Mobility (ICM) and Erasmus Mundus Joint Degrees (Key Action 1); capacity-
building joint projects (targeting individual HE institutions) and structural projects 
(addressing systemic capacity-building) (Key Action 2); dialogue for policy reform (Key 
Action 3); and support for teaching and research on the EU (Jean Monnet). 
 
The research is based on qualitative data obtained from EU documents on external 
action through Erasmus+ in the two regions and documents on multilateral and 
bilateral relations with the three countries. These sources are complemented by expert 
interviews with EU and domestic actors held in March and April 2020. 
 
Based on the findings, which indicate that Erasmus+ embeddedness in the ENP is weak 
and in enlargement policy moderate, this paper argues that Erasmus+ is an invaluable, 
yet not fully exploited, tool for EU external action and diplomacy. To capitalise on the 
programme’s full potential, the EU should take steps to better embed it in its 
geographic policies and public diplomacy. To this end, the paper will conclude with 
some recommendations for the future of EU external engagement in HE. 
 
Objectives of engagement 
 
This section will scrutinise the objectives of the international dimension of Erasmus+ and, 
building on these, examine region-specific objectives in the Eastern Partnership and 
the Western Balkans. This will allow to determine the degree of ambition in pursuing 
and contributing to ENP and enlargement-specific aims through Erasmus+.  
 
The international dimension of Erasmus+ 
 
The EU’s rationale in pursuing an external dimension of Erasmus+ can be traced back 
to the Decision establishing Erasmus+ and the first annual work programme.4 Erasmus+ 
was created to bring together several different programmes and in this way increase 
“synergies, efficiency, and simplification” and “make EU actions more visible, 
 
4 European Union, “Regulation No 1288/2013 establishing Erasmus+”, OJ, L347, 11 December 
2013; European Commission, “Erasmus+ 2014 Annual Work Programme” (hereafter: 2014 Work 
Programme), C(2013) 8193, 27 November 2013. 
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coherent, and attractive”.5 The delineation of a clear external dimension, which 
reinforces Erasmus+’ “undisputable European added value”, is “aimed at supporting 
the Union’s external action” and “work linked to the priorities of European external 
actions”.6  
 
This linkage of Erasmus+ with external action objectives could be conducive to 
differentiation on the basis of the EU’s geographic policies and priorities. However, the 
programme’s mid-term evaluation shows that alignment with EU external action is 
lower than its complementarity with other Union programmes and that there is a 
margin for improvement of its international strand’s “management, visibility, and 
communication”.7 
 
Work programmes throughout the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
largely identify the sustainable development, modernisation, and internationalisation 
of partner countries and their HE institutions as key aims of the international dimension 
of the programme.8 While modernisation through capacity-building projects and 
internationalisation through mobility remain central priorities, intercultural awareness 
and people-to-people contacts are introduced as new elements from 2019 onwards.9 
It is also implicitly acknowledged that the reach of mobility activities is too limited for 
them to constitute an inclusive approach to internationalisation. This is expressed 
through the new ambition to devise “innovative and creative international curricula” 
benefitting both mobile and non-mobile students in partner countries.10 
 
The specific objectives of each Key Action have a similar yet different story to tell. Key 
Action 1 on mobility intends to contribute to the personal and professional 
development of participants and the improvement of teaching quality at large. 
 
5 Ibid., p. 27; European Commission, “Communication: European Higher Education in the 
World”, COM(2013) 499, 11 July 2013, p. 10. 
6 European Commission, “Report: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Erasmus+ Programme (2014-
2020)”, COM(2018) 50, 31 January 2018, p. 4; European Union, “Regulation No 1288/2013 
establishing Erasmus+”, OJ, L347, 11 December 2013, Article 1.4; European Commission, 2014 
Work Programme, op. cit., p. 10; European Commission, “Staff Working Document: Mid-Term 
Evaluation of the Erasmus+ Programme (2014-2020)”, SWD(2018) 40, 31 January 2018, p. 5. 
7 European Commission, “Staff Working Document: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Erasmus+ 
Programme (2014-2020)”, SWD(2018) 40, 31 January 2018, pp. 44, 76. 
8 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., pp. 11-13. 
9 European Commission, “Amendment of the 2019 Annual Work Programme or the 




Intercultural understanding, international networks, and “a sense of citizenship and 
identity” are also seen as desirable results of this Key Action.11 These objectives 
highlight the importance of presenting added value for the programme’s participants, 
diverging from the previous narrative of mobility as a ‘stepping stone’ towards HE 
internationalisation. The objectives of Key Action 2 do not make an explicit reference 
to partner countries, although the EU’s engagement through capacity-building is very 
strong. This Key Action aims at modernisation and increasing synergies between HE 
and strategies for employment, growth, and the promotion of democratic values, 
among others.12 Key Action 3 works towards the involvement of non-governmental 
stakeholders in public debates on policy reform and the increase in international 
exchange of good practices.13 Finally, Jean Monnet’s key aim is the creation of 
“interest in the EU and […] the basis for future poles of European knowledge, 
particularly in Partner Countries”.14 
 
Overall, it is clear that the international dimension of Erasmus+ has some distinct 
objectives. Synergies with other EU policies stands out as a particularly strong 
objective, as do HE internationalisation and modernisation. Over the course of the 
MFF, there is a visible increase in the ambition of the objectives pursued and a 
vocalised focus on the level of individuals. This indicates a top-down and bottom-up 
strategy intending to affect individual perceptions but also relevant structures to bring 




Zooming in on specific EaP-level objectives stemming from Erasmus+ and EaP 
documents, these general objectives can now be related to the EaP framework. 
 
The most prominent aim guiding Erasmus+ engagement in the neighbourhood is the 
pursuit of synergies with the ENP, in line with the Erasmus+ general objective of 
supporting external action. Such references can be traced back to as early as 2011, 
where a Joint Communication on the neighbourhood called for increased 
 
11 European Commission, “Erasmus+ 2020 Annual Work Programme” (hereafter: 2020 Work 
Programme), C(2019)5823, 7 August 2019, p. 67. 
12 Ibid., p. 75. 
13 European Commission, “Amendment of the 2018 Annual Work Programme for the 
implementation of Erasmus+ 2018”, C(2018) 774, 15 February 2018, p. 64. 
14 European Commission, 2020 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 112. 
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cooperation in HE, pursuant also to the ‘more for more’ principle.15 Early Erasmus+ 
documents refer to the need for better “links between policy and programme”, while 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission’s DG International 
Cooperation and Development (DEVCO, now International Partnerships INTPA) 
recognise the “modernisation and opening up of HE” as a key priority for the ENP, to 
be achieved through Erasmus+.16 Recently, Erasmus+ has employed the same 
vocabulary, potentially pointing to synergies and a move towards a common 
narrative that seeps through a wide range of policies. A symbolic example of such 
synergies is the 2015 ENP Review which links education to the management of ‘frozen 
conflicts’ by urging the inclusion of universities from conflict areas in Erasmus+.17 In 
more recent strategic documents, quality enhancement, modernisation, and 
internationalisation through Erasmus+ emerge as a main normative priority.18  
 
The first element differentiating the EU’s engagement in the EaP consists in linkages 
with the labour market. The EU includes mobility and capacity building in HE in the 
neighbourhood under the umbrella of “all sectors relevant to the Internal Market”, 
while the connection of education to the labour market is explicitly defined as a post-
2020 priority.19 The Erasmus+ regulation also calls for the “promotion of regional 
cooperation […] in particular with neighbourhood countries”, while the creation of an 
Erasmus+-based partnership also formed part of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument’s (ENI) priorities.20 Furthermore, the Joint Communication 20 Deliverables for 
2020 sets out the intention of creating a network of universities under the auspices of 
 
15 European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Communication: A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood” (hereafter: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood), 
COM(2011) 303, 25 May 2011, p. 10. 
16 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 30; EEAS, DG DEVCO, 
“Programming of the ENI 2014-2020: Strategic Priorities 2014-2020 and Multi-Annual Indicative 
Programme 2014-2017 – European Neighbourhood-wide programmes”, date unknown, p. 4. 
17 European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Communication: Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (hereafter ENP Review), JOIN(2015) 50, 18 November 2015, p. 9. 
18 European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Communication: Eastern Partnership- 20 
Deliverables for 2020” (hereafter: 20 Deliverables for 2020), SWD(2017) 300, 9 June 2017, pp. 44-
45. 
19 European Commission, High Representative, A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood, op. cit., p. 10; European Commission, High Representative, ENP Review, op. 
cit., p. 9; European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Communication: Eastern 
Partnership Policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that Delivers for 
all” (hereafter: Eastern Partnership Policy beyond 2020), JOIN(2020) 7, 18 March 2020, p. 8. 
20 Erasmus+ Regulation, Article 8.2; EEAS, DG DEVCO, “Programming of the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020” (hereafter: Programming of the ENI 2014-2020), 
date unknown, p. 12. 
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Erasmus+ and member states’ initiatives.21 Such ambition has not been followed up 
consistently. For example, the Key Action 3-funded activity of HE Reform Experts – 
networks of experts promoting reform in partner countries – could work on a regional 
platform, especially capitalising on the already existing EaP multilateral track of 
cooperation.22 However, they are kept on the national level; only recently has this 
ambition started to resurface through an International Policy Dialogue revolving 
around the promotion of regional policy in HE matters.23 
 
A relevant overarching objective of the Eastern Partnership is the strengthening of civil 
society, which has been identified as a “vector for reform”.24 According to the EU 
Global Strategy, educational exchanges strengthen such “societal links”, thus 
facilitating people-to-people contacts, one of the central pillars forming the Eastern 
Partnership.25 Finally, an objective of EU-EaP cooperation in the field of HE which also 
contributes to internationalisation and modernisation is the question of legal 
convergence. This objective falls outside the scope of Erasmus+, strictly speaking, but 
can be promoted through structural projects and policy dialogue. The Association 
Agreements with Georgia and Moldova mention convergence related to the Bologna 
Process.26 This has been recently reiterated on a EaP-wide level, whereby neighbours 
are expected to align their laws and practices “with European developments”, 
explicitly mentioning the Bologna Process but not EU norms and policies, in a potential 
attempt to keep such convergence at arm’s length.27  
 
To sum up, the EU’s engagement in the Eastern Partnership is differentiated along four 
axes: linkages between HE and the labour market, a focus on regionalisation and on 
civil society, and legal approximation. It can be concluded that the EU has an 
 
21 European Commission, High Representative, 20 Deliverables for 2020, op. cit., p. 47. 
22 European Commission, “Communication: European Higher Education in the World”, 
COM(2013) 499, 11 July 2013, p. 13. 
23 European Commission, 2020 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 107. 
24 EEAS, DG DEVCO, Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, op. cit., p. 11. 
25 High Representative, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 2016, p. 25. 
26 European Union, “Association Agreement between the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other 
part”, OJ, L261, 30 August 2014, Article 359; European Union, “Association Agreement between 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part”, OJ, L260, 30 August 2014, 
Article 123. 
27 European Commission, High Representative, Eastern Partnership Policy beyond 2020, op. cit., 
p. 8. 
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ambitious, albeit not very differentiated, approach to cooperation with its Eastern 
neighbours. This ambition can be understood as a ‘side effect’ of pursuing other policy 
objectives like economic growth or democracy, but also as a step towards societal 
approximation. This approximation is based on a double socialisation strategy: on the 
political level through bilateral and multilateral policy dialogue and at grassroots level 
through mobility opportunities for students and academics. These objectives can also 
be linked to an ‘education-security nexus’, as the diffusion of European values through 
educational programmes can consolidate a democratic ‘ring of friends’ around the 
EU, mitigating external security concerns.28 What stands out is that, in its strategic 




Before comparing the Western Balkans to other regions, it is important to note two 
peculiarities that affect the EU’s approach. First, all Western Balkan countries have an 
enlargement perspective, but their respective trajectories of state development and 
European integration differ vastly. Second, candidacy creates a unilateral obligation 
to harmonise domestic legislation with the EU acquis, rather than involving bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations as is the case in the EaP, for example. 
 
From the very beginning, Erasmus+ was seen as a tool contributing to enlargement 
policy objectives.29 According to an official at the Commission’s DG Education and 
Culture (EAC), the aim is for all Western Balkan states to become programme countries 
in the coming years, while they “already participate […] with a higher status than the 
rest of partner countries, as they all pay a reduced yearly entry ticket”.30 As such, a 
nuanced application of the overarching objectives of Erasmus+’ external strand is 
observed. For example, modernisation and internationalisation can be seen as a step 
towards convergence with EU standards and accession to the Union. In support of this 
perspective, the literature posits that internationalisation serves as a vessel for 
domestic reforms rather than as a clear objective in and of itself.31 
 
 
28 B. Bruns, D. Happ, “EU Extra-Territorialisation and Securitisation: What Does it Mean for Ukraine 
and Belarus?”, in B. Bruns, D. Happ, H. Zichner (eds), European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Geopolitics between Integration and Security, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 148. 
29 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 14. 
30 Interview with DG EAC official 1, via email, 3 April 2020. 
31 P. Zgaga et al., Higher Education in the Western Balkans: Reforms, Developments, Trends, 
Ljubljana, University of Ljubljana Faculty of Education, 2013, p. 61. 
Constance Bobotsi 
12 
Much like in the EaP, HE is seen as an important part of the labour market. This objective 
is resonant with domestic perceptions on the importance of HE, as increased 
employability appears to be the perceived added value of tertiary education 
regionwide.32 Addressing a Serbian audience, EU Commissioner Mariya Gabriel 
classified education and research as the most important mechanism for sustainable 
growth and Erasmus+ as a way to address brain drain.33 Brain drain prevails as one of 
the biggest socioeconomic problems in the region, with five Balkan countries making 
the global ‘top 10’ according to the World Economic Forum.34 
 
Looking at objectives specific to the Western Balkans, EU engagement can be traced 
as far back as the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003, where education features as one of 
the key priorities, since it is considered a medium to reconciliation after a decade of 
deadly conflict.35 This reflects the EU’s desire to not import conflicts inside its borders, 
as this process started long before cooperation in other policy areas had been 
formally institutionalised. Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations through 
education are equally prominent in more recent strategic documents.36 In addition to 
its regional dimension, this priority also has an important intra-national dimension, as 
discrimination in access to education has historically been an important issue in the 
ethnically-torn Balkans.37 Reconciliation is attempted in an organic and sustainable 
manner, starting from the bottom-up in order to gradually eliminate prejudices by the 
time of accession. 
 
Mimicking internal EU education policy, the second Western Balkans-specific 
objective is the element of identity-building. Given their (potential) candidacy, the EU 
 
32 Ibid., p. 20. 
33 “Marija Gabriel: Moramo preuzeti kontrolu nad transformacijom sveta rada”, Danas, 
http://www.danas.rs/nedelja/marija-gabrijel-moramo-preuzeti-kontrolu-nad-transformacijom-
sveta-rada, 1 March 2020, consulted 7 March 2020. 
34 The Economist, “The Countries with the Biggest Brain Drain”, 
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/the-economist_when-people-in-rich-countries-worry-about-
activity-6629063517842616320-X-Qo, 2 February 2020, consulted 10 February 2020. 
35 Council of the European Union, “The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans- Moving 
Towards European Integration”, in General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 10369/03, 
16 June 2003, pp. 15, 18. 
36 European Commission, “Communication: A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and 
Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans” (hereafter: Credible Enlargement 
Perspective), COM(2018) 65, 6 February 2018, p. 15. 
37 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document Analytical Report 
Accompanying the Document ‘Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application 
for Membership of the European Union”, SWD(2019) 222, 29 May 2019, p. 152. 
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postulates that “[everyday] life in the Western Balkans should progressively become 
closer to life within the European Union”.38 Two already discussed priorities are used to 
concretely support this objective – socioeconomic development and reconciliation – 
in this way linking the different components of EU engagement in the region.39 The 
integration of all Western Balkan states as Erasmus+ programme countries can 
significantly enhance the EU’s toolbox to pursue this objective.40 
 
It becomes apparent that the EU’s engagement in the Western Balkans has a deeper 
focus than in other regions. Apart from structural change and socialisation, it tries to 
affect deep-seated ideational problems that have posed a challenge for the 
peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups in the region, state-building, and EU 
integration. Even though similar problems also exist in secessionist parts of the Eastern 
Partnership, the EU’s approach in the Western Balkans is significantly more decisive 
and explicit. This can be explained by the prospect of enlargement, which creates a 
greater sense of urgency to resolve national, regional, and ethnic challenges in the 
Balkans. To some extent, the aims pursued in the Western Balkans resemble the internal 
policy design of HE, notably through the promotion of a common identity and the 
instrumentalisation of HE as a tool for economic growth and social progress.  
 
To sum up, the objectives of the international dimension of Erasmus+ provide a solid 
foundation for the EU’s engagement. This is particularly true in the case of the Eastern 
Partnership, where region-specific objectives are not strongly differentiated from those 
universal objectives. In the Western Balkans, a greater emphasis on identity and 
reconciliation leads to the conclusion that engagement is somewhat better 




Having looked at the objectives guiding EU action, it is now time to turn to the 
implementation of the programme. After recalling the key principles that guide all 
Erasmus+ activity in partner countries, the operationalisation of the particular 
objectives for the two regions will be analysed based on the EU’s implementation 
modalities.  
 
38 European Commission, Credible Enlargement Perspective, op. cit., p. 2. 
39 Interview with DG EAC official 1, 3 April 2020; European Commission, “Communication: A 





General implementation principles in partner countries 
 
As explained earlier, the international dimension of Erasmus+ is considered a tool 
furthering external action at large. It is, therefore, logical that contributions from 
financial instruments for other policies are integrated in the Erasmus+ budget.41 For the 
2014-2020 MFF, these were represented under Heading 4 funding and followed the 
EU’s geographic priorities.42 In the final allocation, more than 1.5 billion Euro of the 
Erasmus+ budget came from external action instruments, including the ENI and the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).43 Considering the volume of financial 
contributions coming from the Commission’s DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (NEAR) and DG DEVCO, these two DGs have “an important role in 
deciding to modify the content and modalities of implementation of an action” and 
therefore are in weekly communication with DG EAC.44 
 
Partner countries are not eligible for all strands of Erasmus+; for example, school 
education activities and the flagship initiative of European Universities are only open 
to programme countries. Moreover, applications for ICM funding have to be 
submitted through institutions in programme countries.45 This could socialise HE 
institutions into a system of falsely perceived ‘hierarchy’ between them and demote 
partner countries to an associate status. This is aggravated by the fact that funding for 
organisational costs is only made available to HE institutions from programme 
countries, to be shared with partners from other countries at their discretion.46 This 
appears to be more of a problem in the Eastern Partnership, as both Georgian and 
Moldovan universities rarely receive such funding, whereas funds are more frequently 
shared with BiH universities.47 Finally, partner countries do not have National Agencies 
to which the Commission delegates implementation tasks. Instead, National Erasmus+ 
Offices (NEOs) are tasked with promoting the programme’s visibility, supporting HE 
 
41 European Commission, “Communication: European Higher Education in the World”, 
COM(2013) 499, 11 July 2013, p. 10. 
42 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 14. 
43 European Union, “Regulation No 232/2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood 
Instrument”, OJ, L77/27, 11 March 2014, Article 17. 
44 Interview with a Policy Assistant, DG NEAR, via email, 1 April 2020. 
45 European Commission, 2020 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 69. 
46 Support and Promotion for Higher Education Reform Experts (SPHERE), “Erasmus+ 
International Credit Mobility – A Study of the Mobility of Disadvantaged Students from Partner 
Countries”, January 2020, p. 38. 
47 Ibid., pp. 38-39; Interview with National Erasmus+ Office in the Republic of Moldova, via 
Skype, 18 March 2020. 
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institutions in the application process, and acting as a liaison between the Commission 




The budget dedicated to Erasmus+ from the ENI is not negligible, with a contribution 
of 88 million Euro for 2020, covering both the Eastern and the Southern dimensions.49 
Additionally, 251 million Euro is given to the EaP strand for human rights, good 
governance, and mobility, which encapsulate wider cross-cutting EaP objectives and 
to which educational programmes can contribute.50 Overall, this budget facilitated 
80.000 exchanges from the EaP over the 2014-2020 period and corresponds to more 
than 15% of the global envelope available for Erasmus+ mobility and 11% of the global 
envelope for capacity-building in HE.51 
 
DG NEAR’s well-established channel of communication functions as the “main entry” 
to the region for DG EAC in terms of consultation.52 Dialogue on the multilateral level 
is pursued under the umbrella of the EaP’s platform on people-to-people contacts, 
where a special panel for Education, Culture, and Youth was established in 2017, 
upgrading the importance of HE.53 In 2019, a “structured consultation on the future of 
the EaP” was launched by the Commission, receiving proposals from EU institutions, 
member states, all EaP countries, and other stakeholders.54 According to a 
Commission official, “the consultation showed a broad consensus that the current 
policy framework is robust and should continue delivering tangible results for people” 
and simultaneously revealed the need for increased local engagement and visibility.55 
As such, there is a well-structured framework of inter-institutional and external 
consultation guiding the work of DG EAC and DG NEAR. 
 
 
48 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 55. 
49 European Commission, “Draft General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 
2020, Volume 3, Section III: Commission”, COM(2019) 600, 5 July 2019, p. 1177. 
50 Ibid., p. 1176. 
51 European Commission, “EU Supports Employment Opportunities and Active Citizenship of 
Young People in Eastern Partner Countries”, 6 February 2019; European Commission, “EU-
Eastern Partnership Cooperation through Erasmus+”, 20 September 2019; European 
Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Georgia”, November 2018. 
52 Interview with DG EAC official 1, 3 April 2020.  
53 EEAS, DG DEVCO, Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, op. cit., p. 16; European Commission, 
“EU-Eastern Partnership Cooperation through Erasmus+”, 20 September 2019; Interview with a 
diplomat, Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, via Skype, 24 March 2020. 




The allocation of funds from the EaP envelope to different countries is reflective of the 
different levels of engagement. Georgia’s political proximity to the EU is clearly 
reflected in its budget allocation, having received one quarter of the overall regional 
Erasmus+ budget in 2018.56 Meanwhile, Moldova’s share is the lowest in the region (7% 
for 2015-2018), partly contingent on factors like population.57 However, additional 
funding has been made available to both countries, which is domestically understood 
as a sign of “support for the countries that signed Association Agreements”. 58 EU 
documents equally recognise increased participation in Erasmus+ as a component of 
“EU support” for the implementation of Association Agreements.59 Nonetheless, in 
Georgia, the implementation of Erasmus+ is seen as “somehow parallel” to the ENP 
framework.60 Notwithstanding the EU’s failure to highlight it in its communication 
activities, it can be concluded that the EU successfully links funding to its bilateral 
relations through Association Agreements.  
 
In terms of local authorities’ involvement in the decision-making process, space for 
improvement seems to exist in both Georgia and Moldova. According to the 
Georgian NEO Coordinator, consultations for the 2021-2027 programme were very 
limited across external governments, National Erasmus+ Offices, and EU-based 
stakeholders.61 Representatives of the Moldovan NEO also perceive consultation as 
insufficient, considering it only takes place on a thematic basis and without the 
opportunity to discuss the entire range of education matters.62 
 
The EU Delegation acts as the liaison between Brussels and the local authorities, 
helping the Executive Agency in its selection of capacity-building projects and 
monitoring progress where the Executive Agency cannot do so itself.63 However, it 
“cannot capitalise on these programmes”, which indicates that the Commission only 
 
56 European Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Georgia”, November 2018. 
57 European Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Moldova”, November 2018. 
58 Interview with Lika Glonti, Coordinator of National Erasmus+ Office in Georgia, via Skype, 13 
March 2020; Interview with a diplomat, EU Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, via Skype, 
16 March 2020. 
59 European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Staff Working Document: Association 
Implementation Report on Georgia”, SWD(2020) 30, 6 February 2020, p. 2. 
60 Interview with Lika Glonti, 13 March 2020. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Interview with National Erasmus+ Office in the Republic of Moldova, 18 March 2020. 
63 Interview with a diplomat, EU Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, 16 March 2020. 
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delegates specific tasks to Delegations without leaving them substantial freedom to 
integrate Erasmus+ activities in their day-to-day engagement with citizens.64 
 
In Moldova, Erasmus+ engagement has achieved the inclusion of a ‘frozen conflict’ 
region through the participation of a Transnistrian university in Erasmus+. This move is 
truly symbolic, and in its first year of participation just four students from Tiraspol went 
abroad. However, it opens a significant ‘window of opportunity’ for the EU to further 
engage with Transnistria.65 It also proves that the inclusion of secessionist or disputed 
regions in the programme is possible, as selections and budgets are handled by the 
EU. 
 
Global objectives are significantly more visible in the EU’s Erasmus+ engagement with 
the EaP, as its impact is mostly discussed in terms of capacity-building reforms towards 
modernisation and internationalisation. Such reforms are most often made with 
reference to Bologna Process guidelines, thus linking the overall Association 
Agreement processes of educational reform to Erasmus+ activities and promoting a 
synergy. Reforms and mobility projects also appear to be contributing to the 
strengthening of civil society, including in regions of ‘frozen conflicts’. However, very 
little reference is made to socioeconomic advancement and regional cooperation in 
the implementation of Erasmus+. Finally, the ENP principle of differentiation is not 
applied to the opportunities available for more advanced partner countries, as could 
be the case to prompt further progress and convergence. Apart from funding, the 
degree of integration in the EaP framework is rather low and implementation 




The budget allocation for the Western Balkans is rather significant: in 2020, 32 million 
Euro from the IPA were earmarked for Erasmus+, while 18% of the global Erasmus+ 
budget for individual mobility is allocated to the region.66 In terms of dialogue, DG 




66 European Commission, “Draft General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 
2020, Volume 3, Section III: Commission”, p. 1162; European Commission, “Erasmus+ 
International Credit Mobility: Handbook for Participating Organisations, Version 2.0”, November 
2017, p. 9. 
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with DG EAC.67 Here too, some very important advancements setting the Western 
Balkans apart from other regions are noted. 
 
In order to maintain a credible enlargement perspective and accelerate progress, the 
EU increasingly invites Western Balkan governments to informal Councils and 
technical-level discussions in relevant committees and working groups.68 All Western 
Balkan states have appointed representatives to participate in discussions on the EU’s 
strategic framework for education and training and in the Open Method of 
Coordination.69 This allows for an unprecedented degree of input and potentially a 
first step towards elite socialisation into the Brussels modus operandi modelled on the 
experience of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. However, it is not clear how 
substantive the input of the Western Balkan states is through this mechanism. For 
example, in an informal video conference of EU Education Ministers, even though the 
Ministers from Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland were invited, Western Balkan states 
were absent.70  
 
Simultaneously, Ministerial meetings through the Western Balkans Platform on 
Education and Training are foreseen on an annual basis, with additional follow-up 
technical sessions.71 Ministerials also take place in the framework of the European 
Semester-like Economic Reform Programmes, whereby discussion on education 
“covers all levels of the education system, governance, and financing”.72 
 
The implementation of Erasmus+ in BiH warrants special attention due to the country’s 
institutional complexity, consisting of two entities and one district, ten cantons, and a 
central state-level government. In education, the competence lies on the cantonal 
level in the Federation, with the entity in Republika Srpska, and with the Brčko District, 
while international cooperation is dealt with centrally.73 In consultations, DG NEAR tries 
 
67 Interview with a DG NEAR official, via email, 3 April 2020. 
68 European Commission, Credible Enlargement Perspective, op. cit., p. 9. 
69 M. Jusić, N. Obradović, “Enlargement Policy and Social Change in the Western Balkans”, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2019, p. 20. 
70 Council of the European Union, “Press Conference Following the Video Conference of 
Ministers of Education”, https://video.consilium.europa.eu/en/webcast/7b4bdfcb-f9f1-4a3f-
9510-42c404c470ea, 14 April 2020, consulted 15 April 2020. 
71 European Commission, 2014 Work Programme, op. cit., p. 87. 
72 Interview with a Policy Assistant, DG NEAR, 1 April 2020. 
73 Interview with Dejan Rosić, Project Officer in the National Erasmus+ Office in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, via email, 13 April 2020. 
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to involve all relevant actors and always stresses the need for “country-wide coverage 
with all public policies” in interactions with the central government.74 However, 
especially considering ethnic divisions in BiH and the significance of education in 
nation-building, it should not come as a surprise that education policy is fragmented 
and often contradictory. Out of the almost 4000 questions in the questionnaire 
accompanying its application for EU membership, BiH failed to answer 22 due to 
internal disagreements; 17 related to education policy.75 BiH’s struggle with 
harmonising its accreditation system leads to a significant reduction of proposals for 
structural curriculum-related projects, which in turn affects the entire selection of 
Erasmus+ projects covered by the IPA.76 Considering that ICM is premised upon a 
common framework of recognition, these discrepancies also impact mobility.77  
 
As part of BiH’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement, education matters are 
discussed in the annual Sub-Committee on Innovation, Information Society, and Social 
Policy with “all levels of the administration” present and with an agenda co-set by the 
Commission and national authorities.78 The EU Delegation consults with civil society to 
ensure appropriate input in these annual meetings and maintains an open line of 
dialogue with the government.79 In collaboration with the NEO, it also helps increase 
visibility and understanding, for example by organising annual pre-departure events 
for outgoing Erasmus+ participants.80 
 
In this case, region-specific objectives are put into practice rather clearly. Formal 
conditionality and convergence with the EU acquis are not pursued through Erasmus+, 
but the selection of relevant structural projects under Key Action 2 can further 
enlargement negotiations. In terms of socioeconomic development, it becomes clear 
that education is clustered together with other social policies in the EU’s interactions 




74 Interview with a DG NEAR official, 3 April 2020. 
75 European Commission, “Communication: Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union”, COM(2019) 261, 29 May 2019, pp. 2-3. 
76 European Commission, “IPA Multi-Country Programmes: Activity Report January-June 2019”, 
date unknown, p. 184. 
77 Interview with Dejan Rosić, 13 April 2020. 
78 Interview with a DG NEAR official, 3 April 2020. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Interview with DG EAC official 1, 3 April 2020. 
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Reconciliation is operationalised on two dimensions. Clearly, the opportunity to travel 
abroad and meet new cultures and ways of thinking promotes bottom-up 
reconciliation nationally and regionally. Nonetheless, the EU also attempts to address 
this objective in a top-down fashion. By pushing for country-wide solutions and 
applications in BiH, it tries to create mutual understanding and bring different groups 
together on the governmental and administrative levels. Meetings covering the entire 
region also produce this effect on a regional scale. Finally, the inclusion in relevant 
internal EU procedures socialises politicians and civil servants into the EU system and 
creates the foundation for a common identity that can be mirrored in domestic 
policies and ultimately transferred to citizens. 
 
Overall, the attention given to Erasmus+ in the Western Balkans in terms of budget, 
decision-making, and delegation of tasks among EU institutional actors reflects the 
level of priority that this region represents for the EU. Here, integration in the overall 
framework of external engagement is moderate to high. The robust pre-accession 
framework “does not overshadow” Erasmus+, according to a DG EAC official.81 On 
the contrary, the implementation of Erasmus+ by DG NEAR and the EEAS, where 
appropriate, ensures the contextualisation of the programme in the wider framework 
of engagement. 
 
Barring the availability of supplementary funding, the embeddedness of EU HE 
engagement in the EaP in terms of implementation appears to be rather weak. By 
contrast, the EU’s firm approach in the Western Balkans is reflected in the clear pursuit 




Finally, turning to receptibility, domestic acceptance in Georgia, Moldova, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will be examined successively. The three countries are appropriate 
for comparison as they all have statehood consolidation problems, which may affect 
domestic absorption. Equally, they aspire to a closer relationship with the EU, they are 
Erasmus+ partner countries, and are not candidate states. This examination will offer a 
glimpse into the impact of the EU’s engagement as analysed in the paper so far and 
segue into pragmatic, actionable policy recommendations for the European Union. 
 
81 Ibid. 





Erasmus+ is no exception to Georgia’s high engagement with the EU, with more than 
3500 participants benefitting from ICM and around 1000 project proposals involving 
Georgia being submitted in the 2015-2018 period.82 Georgia ranks 8th among all 
Erasmus+ partner countries around the world in terms of successful projects.83  
 
This high level of participation is also evidenced on the political level. The Georgian 
government aspires to programme country status, which, according to the Georgian 
NEO Coordinator, is “a politically driven decision”.84 The politicisation of such decisions 
indicates that the stakes for cooperation with the EU on education matters are quite 
high. Georgia’s keenness to benefit more from its partnership with the EU is also 
confirmed by a report from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, which asserts that Georgia is “seeking greater alignment to EU policies 
and practices”.85 This attitude may be partly attributed to ‘self-conditionality’ and ‘self-
socialisation’, concepts which capture some EaP countries’ tendency to follow EU 
policies as if they were enlargement candidates in the hope to eventually acquire 
candidate status.86 In national strategic documents, Erasmus+ is also recognised as a 
vector leading to “high academic performance and internationalisation”.87 However, 
it is also acknowledged that Erasmus+ activities are “not sufficient to make significant 
impacts at the systemic level” [sic].88 
 
The Georgian people resonate with reforms and pursue more participation in EU 
programmes, as these provide them with the tools to implement reforms that reflect 
 
 
83 Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport of Georgia, “Unified Strategy for Education 
and Science for 2017-2021”, http://mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=7755&lang=eng, date 
unknown, consulted 4 January 2020, p. 6. 
84 Interview with Lika Glonti, 13 March 2020. 
85 R. Ruochen Li et al., OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Georgia, 
Paris, OECD Publishing, 2019, p. 209. 
86 F. Schimmelfennig, “Europeanisation Beyond the Member States”, Zeitschrift für Staats- und 
Europawissenschaften, 2010, p. 333. 
87 Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport of Georgia, “Midterm Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the Unified Strategy for Education and Science 2017-2021”, 
http://mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=7755&lang=eng, 21 February 2019, consulted 4 January 
2020, p. 47. 
88 Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport of Georgia, “Unified Strategy for Education 
and Science for 2017-2021”, http://mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=7755&lang=eng, date 
unknown, consulted 4 January 2020, p. 28. 
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the country’s needs.89 Indicatively, 48% of the public recognises the EU’s role in 
improving Georgian education.90 This is also manifested through the non-negligible 
increase of structural projects, which target the national level, initiated by Georgian 
actors in collaboration with European partners.91 
 
In terms of the durability of reforms, Georgia faces a general structural problem due 
to the frequent change of government. As described by the NEO Coordinator, 
“institutions do not work and individuals mean a lot” which has led to delays in passing 
measures that were initiated by former Ministers.92 This problem of internal durability 
should be addressed by the EU, not least for the country’s general governance, as it 
could set back Georgia’s significant progress in various sectors. Despite these 
problems though, the ‘main’ reforms stemming from the Bologna Process remain in 
place.93 
 
Hence, the level of receptibility in Georgia is high despite some general governance 
issues. EU-promoted reforms are received with a high level of domestic ownership and 
seen as desirable. The only danger is the potential saturation of interest in the future if 
Georgia is not given more opportunities through Erasmus+, considering its progress in 




Capacity building remains at the heart of discussions on Erasmus+’ effectiveness in 
Moldova. The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Research acknowledges the impact 
of EU-promoted reforms and, even though awareness about the specificities of 
Erasmus+ remains low on the political level, support for it and for relevant domestic 
actors is high.94 The narrative largely centres around the EU’s ability to introduce 
effective reforms; for example, the NEO believes that Bologna Process reforms would 
not have been as smoothly implemented in the absence of further reforms prompted 
by EU programmes.95 Since the introduction of these central reforms, “a new 
 
89 Interview with Lika Glonti, 13 March 2020. 
90 EU Neighbours East, “Annual Survey Report: 4th Wave”, May 2019, p. 49. 
91 Interview with Lika Glonti, 13 March 2020. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Interview with the National Erasmus+ Office of the Republic of Moldova, 18 March 2020. 
95 Ibid. 
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generation of students” has been educated and socialised into a more Europeanised 
system.96 
 
Interestingly, Moldova is the only EaP country where educational programmes are 
overtaken by ‘infrastructure development projects’ as the most visible activities that 
citizens associate with the EU.97 This may indicate that the primary added value of the 
programme for Moldova is not student mobility, but rather more structural and usually 
less visible capacity-building projects. The 13 joint projects currently implemented 
around the country present an opportunity for systemic improvement; such projects 
have produced a “qualitative jump of the entire system” and contributed to positive 
reforms outside their scope.98 Reforms appear to be durable, but their visibility in 
society and even among university students and staff is low.99 Nonetheless, there is a 
strong sense of ownership for staff participating in capacity-building projects.100 
 
The percentage of selected capacity-building proposals from Moldova was very low 
throughout the MFF, ranging from 6% to 10% of applications.101 This may mean that, 
despite high interest, the quality of applications is insufficient, as also indicated by a 
Moldovan diplomat, who expressed their wish to see more competitive Moldovan 
proposals corresponding to EaP standards.102  
 
Finally, there is no agreement on whether the cultural proximity between Romania and 
Moldova impacts the latter’s reception of Erasmus+. From an EU perspective, Moldova 
consults with Romania for feedback on reforms that Romania has already 
implemented, without there being a further link with Moldovans’ acceptance of 
Erasmus+ and related reforms.103 However, there appears to be ample cooperation 
on the level of the NEO and Romania’s National Agency. Apart from support in ICM 
implementation, the two organisations hold joint activities with universities from both 
countries and try to increase participation and potentially widen the type of projects 
 
96 Interview with a diplomat, Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, 24 March 2020. 
97 EU Neighbours East, “Annual Survey Report: 4th Wave”, May 2019, p. 49. 
98 Interview with a diplomat, Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, 24 March 2020. 
99 Interview with a diplomat, EU Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, 16 March 2020; 
Interview with the National Erasmus+ Office of the Republic of Moldova, 18 March 2020. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Interview with a diplomat, Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, 24 March 2020. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Interview with a diplomat, EU Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, 16 March 2020. 
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pursued in Moldova.104 This proximity makes the programme and individual activities 
“more understandable” to Moldovans.105  
 
To conclude, the main problem in Moldova appears to be the quality of proposals 
submitted and, by extension, the small number of those selected. However, ICM and 
a more Europeanised educational system are very well received, while capacity-
building projects have led to quality improvement and a more widespread European 
identity. All things considered, the degree of receptibility in Moldova is high. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in Erasmus+ is rather satisfactory considering 
the aforementioned structural limitations. In 2018, more than 1000 students and staff 
took part in exchanges and 141 proposals involving BiH were selected out of a total of 
191 received.106  
 
Engagement through Jean Monnet activities could be key in increasing interest and 
positive identification with the EU; however, in the period between 2015 and 2018, only 
3 projects were selected from BiH.107 Such engagement will be crucial in the coming 
years, taking into account the lengthy candidateship process which may reduce 
momentum and shift public opinion away from the EU. Revisiting the objective of 
approximating every-day life in the Western Balkans to the EU, Erasmus+ is perceived 
domestically as “one of the strongest promotional tools of the EU’s values and 
probably [the] most successful”, indicating that there is fertile ground for more Jean 
Monnet engagement.108  
 
The programme is received well not only on the level of individual participants but also 
by HE institutions and governments.109 However, the lack of coordination often hinders 
implementation and integration in general.110 The situation is aggravated by the “lack 
 
104 Interview with the National Erasmus+ Office of the Republic of Moldova, 18 March 2020. 
105 Ibid. 
106 European Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Bosnia Herzegovina”, November 
2018. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Interview with Dejan Rosić, 13 April 2020. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Jusić, Obradović, op. cit., p. 22. 
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of skilled policy-making staff” due to the hyper-fragmentation of HE policy, which 
virtually makes universities policymakers.111  
 
In engaging with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU must be aware of certain underlying 
challenges and risks. Erasmus+ funding must be part of a strategy addressing 
overarching governance problems in order to prevent the perpetuation and 
exacerbation of structural problems. The literature has identified this as “the desire to 
‘Europeanise’ the system overnight [which has] too often resulted in ‘cosmetic 
changes’”.112 The EU must be careful so as not to prompt hasty reforms. 
 
All in all, and despite the plurality of voices and actors, Erasmus+ appears to be 
perceived as a way to explore and understand the EU. It can be concluded that the 
EU’s increased efforts in the region are received well and provoke demand for further 
engagement. 
 
As could be expected, receptibility is overwhelmingly positive in all three cases despite 
domestic constraints caused by the frequent change of government, low quality of 
proposals, and over-fragmentation of education policy. The three countries are keen 
on a closer relationship with the EU and invite more engagement. 
 
Discussion of the findings 
 
It is now time to return to the central question of the paper, namely to what extent 
Erasmus+ engagement is embedded in the overarching frameworks of the ENP and 
enlargement policy. The analysis has shown that external engagement through 
Erasmus+ is primarily guided by overarching global objectives. There is some 
elaboration of Eastern Partnership-specific objectives, which, however, are not 
sufficiently autonomous from universal Erasmus+ objectives to be considered as 
substantial differentiation. The link made with civil society is indicative of some extent 
of integration in the wider EaP framework, where one of the four platforms of 
engagement refers to civil society. Meanwhile, there is some differentiation of 
engagement in the Western Balkans due to the countries’ special status as (potential) 
candidates, with specific objectives covering socioeconomic development, national 
and regional reconciliation, and the creation of a common identity. 
 
111 Ibid., p. 45. 
112 Zgaga et al., op. cit., p. 16. 
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In terms of programme implementation in the EaP, a synergy consists in the availability 
of additional funding for countries that have signed Association Agreements. The 
principle of differentiation is not utilised in Erasmus+ activity more broadly, in this way 
undermining the total level of integration in the EaP framework. In the Western Balkans, 
a clearer link was observed between objectives of action and implementation. 
Integration in the enlargement framework manifests itself in the form of linkages 
between HE and wider social policy and by allowing participation in relevant EU 
meetings. Erasmus+ in this case is moderately but impactfully integrated in the 
enlargement framework. 
 
Finally, all three countries have an overwhelmingly positive experience with Erasmus+, 
which can be explained by their overall close relationship to the EU and high 
ambitions. As is logical given the selection of the three countries, the keenness to 
converge with European standards is high in all cases, even when domestic constraints 
pose a challenge to the selection and impact of Erasmus+ projects. Opinions about 
the degree of integration of Erasmus+ in the wider ENP or enlargement framework 
remain mixed. 
 
All in all, there is relatively little variation of the EU’s engagement in terms of its 
objectives and implementation on the basis of the overarching policy framework. 
Undoubtedly, the degree of embeddedness is higher in the enlargement space than 
it is in the EaP both in the objectives pursued and in the implementation of the 
programme. The most important implication of this conclusion is that the programme’s 
externalisation and the EU’s engagement towards the two regions is not optimally 
efficient. A better integration of Erasmus+ and other Union programmes into these 
frameworks can accelerate progress, as they can be used as part of the Union’s 
conditionality scheme or in order to create momentum in HE and other sectors. Finally, 
the current situation can be the source of confusion and transmit an unnecessarily 
overcomplicated image of the EU to partner countries’ citizens. These observations 
lead to some policy recommendations on strengthening the link between the external 
dimension of Erasmus+ and the EU’s overall external action and diplomacy. 
 
Synergies with conditionality 
 
Erasmus+ operates in parallel to the conditionality employed by the EU in its 
geographic policies despite its potential as a carrot in the equation to encourage 
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further cross-sectoral improvement. Incorporating Erasmus+ achievements and 
benchmarks is feasible in the Eastern Partnership and the pre-accession framework, 
where the programme can act as an incentive leading to further benefits in education 
or other policies. Such practice can create strong momentum, through which more 
difficult reforms can be tackled in related fields like democracy, human rights, and 
rule of law. Particularly where reforms have stagnated, this momentum may be 
incremental in breaking out of deadlock. Especially in these fields, education forms 
part of the solution as it can affect citizens’ perceptions about society and 
governance, as well as set the example for further structural reforms on the basis of 
those implemented in HE. 
 
‘More for more’ 
 
Under the key principle of differentiation, the more engagement and compliance with 
the EU an ENP state pursues, the more rewards it gets from Brussels. The results of 
differentiation are evident in all policy areas, and so Erasmus+ should also be reflective 
of the variation of ENP countries’ relationship with the EU. Of course, it must be kept in 
mind that Erasmus+ can approximate less Europhile countries to the EU and socialise 
their citizens into EU values. Therefore, it is crucial that Erasmus+ activity in less engaged 
neighbouring countries continues at the same, if not increased, intensity. 
 
Differentiation should not be manifested through discrimination of applications 
coming from certain countries against others. However, it is possible to open up 
additional strands of Erasmus+ for the countries that have sufficiently approximated 
their educational systems to Bologna Process and EU standards. In the medium term, 
an upgrade to programme country status could be an additional reward. This will 
require significant progress, but is clearly pursued by the ‘frontrunners’ of the EaP and 
will allow for a clear and definitive differentiation of EaP countries in the field of 
education. 
 
European Universities Initiative in the Western Balkans 
 
The current internal Erasmus+ priority is the refinement of the European Universities 
Initiative, which, for the pilot calls, is only open to programme countries. An 
encouraging sign is that the original idea of excluding non-EU programme countries 
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has been scrapped, rendering further expansion conceivable.113 The inclusion of 
Western Balkan states to the initiative from the outset can be an invaluable tool for 
socialisation and lead to more effective reforms and adherence to the EU acquis. 
Through participation in the Initiative, Western Balkan states can start being involved 
in internal aspects of Erasmus+. Simultaneously, the increased exchange of good 
practices within the consortia is likely to lead to university-level and, inductively, also 
nation-wide reforms. The opportunity for students and staff to interact with peers from 
other countries in a more ‘integrated’ manner compared to short-term exchanges is 
also likely to increase grassroots understanding and approximate life to the EU. 
 
Evidently, the feasibility of such an expansion is contingent on full compliance with the 
Bologna Process. Therefore, clear and timely communication of such an 
advancement and its conditions needs to be made to the respective governments. 
Particularly in BiH, this initiative can accelerate the implementation of Bologna reforms 
in pursuit of greater opportunities under Erasmus+. Considering the fact that the 
Commission would like all four remaining states to become programme countries 
within the 2021-2027 MFF cycle, the introduction of this initiative before programme 
status can equally facilitate this upgrade and socialise them into the EU HE area more 
smoothly. 
 
A bigger role for National Erasmus+ Offices 
 
Upgrading the role of NEOs can be beneficial for the EU in managing Erasmus+ and in 
tailoring the programme to the specific needs of each country. Their role can be 
modelled on National Agencies to include delegated tasks from Brussels and an 
increased representative role in consultations with the EU. National Erasmus+ Offices 
are sometimes excluded from national dialogue, despite their unique position which 
permits them to collect individual HE institutions’ and civil society’s views on 
cooperation with the EU. In the coming years, the EU should make full use of their 
network’s added value in order to ensure a fuller picture and a more tailored 
approach. In this way, they can also more effectively provide guidance for applicants 
and increase the overall quality of proposals submitted in partner countries. 
 
 
113 Klaus Birk, Director of German National Agency (at the time), “International Collaboration: 
Alliances Going Beyond the EU/EEA”, panel discussion, Guild Forum 2019, Brussels, 5 December 
2019. 
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EU education diplomacy 
 
The role of Erasmus+ as a perception shaper and socialising tool of the European Union 
underpins the paper’s central argument and has been consistently underlined in the 
findings. The EU Global Strategy equally highlights the significance of “joining-up public 
diplomacy across different fields”.114 Despite this, the programme is not sufficiently 
integrated in the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy. The pluralist and bottom-up 
nature of cultural diplomacy brings non-governmental actors to the fore; the 
importance of such actors in promoting EU values through education must be 
acknowledged and included in the EEAS’ cultural diplomacy strategy. A first step is 
observed in the Joint Communication on International Cultural Relations, where 
education is labelled an “[agent] for dialogue and exchange”; however, in practice, 
it remains relatively marginal.115 
 
As argued by Piros and Koops, in order to remain relevant in the modern global 
landscape, the EU must “[diversify] its diplomatic toolkit not in a vacuum but linking 
the appropriate policy instruments with the relevant actors”.116 A diplomatic strategy 
capitalising on education and Erasmus+ as a tool can be hybrid, implemented both 
through EU Delegations as well as through the EU27 national diplomatic systems. This 
can strengthen the strategy’s impact while simultaneously increasing member states’ 
engagement with the international dimension of Erasmus+ in their bilateral and 
multilateral handlings. 
 
External engagement through Erasmus+ offers a unique opportunity to project the 
image of an open EU to different levels of society and should be exploited to the full 
in promoting the Union, its actions, and its values through EU public and cultural 
diplomacy. The practical, empirical perspective of grassroots participation can have 
an irreplaceable enriching added value which in turn can augment the overall EU 
narrative and image, as well as their reception abroad. 
 
 
114 High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 
2016, p. 23. 
115 European Commission, High Representative, “Joint Communication: Towards an EU Strategy 
for International Cultural Relations”, JOIN(2016) 29, 8 June 2016, p. 16. 
116 S. Piros, J. Koops, “Towards a Sustainable Approach to EU Education Diplomacy? The Case 
of Capacity-Building in the Eastern Partnership”, in C. Carta, R. Higgott (eds), Cultural 
Diplomacy in Europe, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 133. 
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Conclusion: towards increased embeddedness 
 
This paper presents a preliminary attempt to understand the co-existence of and 
interaction between Erasmus+ on the one part and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and enlargement policy on the other part. It examined the degree of 
embeddedness of Erasmus+ in these policies and argued that Erasmus+ is an 
invaluable, yet rather unexploited, tool for the EU’s external action and diplomacy. 
Through the investigation of objectives, implementation, and receptibility of the 
programme in the two regions, it showed that the embeddedness of the EU’s Erasmus+ 
engagement in the Eastern Partnership is weak and in the Western Balkans moderate. 
Based on these findings, policy recommendations were formulated to increase the 
impact of the programme in the 2021-2027 MFF and beyond. 
 
The selection of three largely pro-EU cases may limit the power of generalisation of this 
study with regard to partner countries’ receptibility and ambition to participate in 
more aspects of Erasmus+, particularly in the case of the EaP. This ‘bias’ has been 
taken into account throughout; the policy recommendations reflect and reinforce this 
by emphasising the need for more differentiation in the EU’s engagement with 
advanced EaP countries. 
 
Future research is needed to investigate to what extent the identified ‘first steps’ of 
integration continue and are strengthened in the 2021-2027 MFF. More holistic and in-
depth analyses of domestic receptibility of Erasmus+ in different countries can also 
constitute the basis for future EU country-specific or regional priorities and strategies. 
Lastly, the degree of complementarity of Erasmus+ and other thematic policies or 
programmes is a related research avenue of high interest and policy relevance. All in 
all, if one thing is to be taken away from this paper, it is undoubtedly that the EU’s 
external action and diplomacy can benefit and remain suitable for the 21st century 
through synergies with and embeddedness of its most renowned policies and 
programmes. 
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